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Abstract 
 
The ongoing global financial crisis has become prominently visible since 
September 2008. This crisis affected the whole world and enhanced the 
importance of policy implementation to mitigate financial crises in future. Many 
academics blamed insufficient domestic regulation as the reason of crises, others 
pointed to the lack of overseas financial regulation and inappropriate actions by 
international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank.  This whole 
discussion encouraged to look back and analyzed a previous crisis in smallest 
countries such as Russia. This paper evidently shows the inefficiency of IMF 
policy during the Russia Crisis in 1998 by implementing a new monetary balance-
of-payment model in Russian data. This model identified the role of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and international economic policy implications on 
the likelihood and the timing of the currency crisis in Russia. For the period from 
December 1995 to December 1998 it was found that, the increase in domestic 
credit growth gradually undermined confidence in the fixed exchange rate regime. 
The most dangerous point was at the end of 1998, when the collapse probability 
was above 90 percent. This result ambiguously questioned the IMF’s July packet 
1998 and proved the political aspects of this financial help. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ongoing global financial crisis affected the whole world. The 
failure, of several large United States-based financial firms caused intensive 
discussion about the future of international financial supervision and position of 
International Monetary Fund.  Since 1944 the IMF has supported many 
countries though loans, research advisors and economic programs. However, 
critics highlight various examples in which democratized countries fell 
economically after receiving IMF programs. For instance, Russia in 1998 was 
one of example of IMF intervention. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
was believed that Russia would soon be integrated into the global market. The 
two main international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank focused on 
Russia to implement the macroeconomic stability program. However, after six 
years of economic reform in Russia, privatisation and macroeconomic 
stabilisation had only limited success such as exchange rate stability in bands 
and low inflation rate. Especially a problem of high corruptions intensified the 
problem of moral hard and averse selection which limited the possibility of 
reforms success. On the other hand, in August 1998, Russia was forced to 
default on its sovereign debt, devalue the Rouble, and suspend payments by 
commercial banks to foreign creditors. Under these circumstances, basic 
common sense suggested Russia could be heading for a fundamental 
macroeconomic crisis (the hypothesis of the existing so-called first generation 
model). However, the global financial markets reacted with shock and surprise 
at Russia’s default in August 1998 because it was widely believed that Russia 
was too politically important to default. In addition, through the 1990s, Russia 
had operated under the auspices and close scrutiny of a Fund-supported 
program. It is natural to pose the question:  What did cause the Russian 
economy to face a currency crisis after so much had been accomplished and 
what was the impact of IMF intervention on Russian crisis?  
It seems natural to analyse in this paper the reasons for the Russian 
crisis and explain the IMF’s impact on this crisis. In order to explain this, three 
aspects will need to be analysed. Firstly, how theoretical studies might explain 
the Russian currency crisis. Secondly, whether this crisis could have been 
predicted in theoretical terms or whether the crisis might have been inevitable, 
and lastly, but not least, how can the impact of difficult external intervention, 
especially by the IMF, on the crisis be understood? It is not possible to leave 
out of the account the impact of the IMF intervention on the Russian economy 
and investors’ expectations.  
This paper is divided into four parts. The first part describes the 
theoretical basis of the currency crisis though various generations of models. 
Then the second part presents the empirical literature review, especially the 
analysis of a single country. In the last part, the Russian case is described in 
order to adopt the empirical econometric model, in which I modified CVW’s 
model (a monetary balance–of-payments model) (Cumby and Van 
Wijnbergen’s model). This modification answers the question of whether the 
crisis could have been predicted. The section discusses the role of the IMF in 
the Russian crisis.   
2. Theoretical models of currency crises 
The theoretical discussion is mainly presented by three different 
currency crisis stories (Kamisky (2003), Sagib(2002) Sulimierska (2008 a,b)).  
The first story was inspired by the Latin American currency crisis in the late 
1960s and early 1970s- it is so-called “first generation models” (or “cannonical 
models”). These models stress that crises are caused by unsustainable fiscal and 
monetary expansion that cause a persistent loss of foreign reserves. Since 
market agents start doubting the ability of the central bank to control the fixed 
exchange rates system. Then reserves fall to a critical threshold, the rational 
agents initiate speculative attacks on the foreign exchange which lead to the 
collapse of the exchange rate (see Krugman (1979), Salant and Henderson 
(1978), Dornbush (1987) and Flood and Garber (1984), Flood, Garber and 
Kramer (1996)).  
After the EMS crises of the early 1990s, the second story developed on 
the base of imprecise irrational behaviours of investors on financial markets 
(so-called “second generation models”). The European countries did not have 
any problem of divergence between fiscal policy and exchange rate policy; in 
this case a crisis can happen without a significant change in macroeconomics 
fundaments. Generally, there are two main lines among second generation 
models:  the self-fulfilling currency crisis models and the pure speculative 
models. The main difference between these two lines of models is that self-
fulfilling models effects a crisis as a result of rational market respond to 
persistently conflicting internal and external macroeconomic targets. On the 
contrary, pure speculative models consider the crisis as the reflection of 
irrational private behaviour. The self-fulfilling models point that the core of the 
currency crisis is directly linked with the market agents’ formation of 
expectation about future exchange rate policy (mainly investors’ rumours). The 
government policy is a kind of trade-off between the benefits and costs of 
maintaining a credible exchange rate peg. Government faces two conflicting 
targets: reducing inflation and keeping economic activity. The peg exchange 
rates might allow achieving the first goal; however, there is possibility of the 
loss of competitiveness and a recession with sticky prices. On the other hand, 
devaluations of exchange rate might restore competitiveness and eliminate the 
unemployment. At the same time, the market agents create expectations about 
this future government policy and then start the actions that affect some 
variables (e.g. interest rate) and wait for economic policies to respond. In that 
case, the level of reserve will mainly depend on the degree of commitment of 
authorities to hold the peg. The weaker the commitment of the authorities the 
higher the probability that the speculative attack will be successful (see 
Obstfeld (1986a,b, 1994) Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), Reisen (1998) and 
Krugman (1996)). 
The pure speculation models have two interesting tales to be told. The 
first tale describes the speculation against the currency as the consequence of 
herding behaviour (Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Binkhchandani and 
Sharma(2000)). Then the second tale gives large attention to the contagion and 
sudden stops effects (Gerlach and Smets (1995), Eichenngreen, Rose, Wyplosz 
(1996), Masson (1998)).1 There are two different ways to present the herding 
behaviours. Firstly, full information assumption does not hold, agents have 
different pieces of information due to the cost of information. In order to reduce 
this cost, individuals start to base their behaviours on the behaviours of others 
(so-called leaders). This might move financial market to an ineffective 
distribution and then to a crisis outcome (Calvo and Mendoza (2000)). 
Secondly, the manager’s salary will not decrease so much if the other investors 
on the market make the same mistake. In that situation the cost of standing out 
against other portfolio managers’ crowd is larger than followed wrong along 
with everyone. (Binkhchandani and Sharma(2000)). 
The last story about crisis, the so-called third generation model of 
currency crisis, has been developed rapidly soon after the Asian crisis.  This 
crisis could not be explained by previous theoretical models and moved 
 
1The contagion and hedging effects is considered as the part of the second-generation models 
instead of being the special category of third generation models such as financial market in 
efficiencies. In theoretical analysis is followed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reihard (1997), 
Esquivel and Larrain (1998) and Sulimierska (2008 a,b).   
attentions to micro fundamentals of an economy (see Krugman (1998, 1999 a,b) 
and Velasco (2001)). The third generation models consider three micro 
fundamentals of an economy as reasons of the currency crisis: 
-fragility of banking system (McKinnon and Huw Pill(1996), Chang and 
Velasco (1998 a, b, c), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)); 
-financial market inefficiency (moral hazard or the problem of asymmetrical 
information) (see Stoker (1994), Mishkin (1996) Krugman (1998)) 
-companies’ balance sheet and the effects of monetary policy (see Krugman 
(1999 a,b), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000,2001),Borenszten and Lee 
(2000), Coulibaly and  Millar (2008)) 
The first issue addressed in the development of third generation models 
were the fragility of the banking system and financial market inefficiency. The 
discussion might be started at the modern variants of the first generation model, 
the so-called twin banking-currency crisis model (Glick and Hutchison (2001)).  
This framework stresses the fact that currency crises are often part of broader 
financial crises, where the two elements interact with one another, giving life to 
what have been called the “twin crises”.2 These models suggest that when 
central banks finance the bailout of troubled financial institutions by printing 
money and open the economy with exchange rate peg, there is the classic story 
of a currency crash prompted by excessive money creation (see Stoker (1994), 
Mishkin (1996)) Krugman (1998, 1999a,b), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). 
After that, Chang and Velasco (1998 a, b, c) investigated more intensely the 
aspects of the financial fragility and currency crisis.  In opened economy 
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 The twin banking-currency crisis model relies on the Diamond and Dybvig‘s dilemma (1983). 
There are two possible outcomes of the market agents: first, agents have confidence in the 
solvency of financial intermediaries, and second there is a lack of confidence which leads to a run. 
Both equilibrium involve self-fulfilling expectations because banks fail. The poor supervision of 
monetary authorities and the asymmetrical information problem results in financial markets being 
unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment 
opportunities and therefore making them the crash of the banking system (see Mishkin (1996)) 
models, the banks play active role, not only as distributor of deposits, but also 
generating large capital inflows to the economy though borrowing money from 
aboard at a low interest rate and then reinvest in the domestic market. But at the 
same time it creates the risk of a sudden reversal of capital flows and 
international illiquidity3 of the domestic financial system. For instance, if 
depositors will attempt to withdraw funds in the short run and then foreign 
creditors will not roll over initial credit in the short run. In that case, the bank 
will not be able to honour all of its commitments.  The domestic banks do not 
have enough domestic deposits in liquid form. Long-term investments of the 
domestic bank will yield little if they have to be liquidated prematurely. The 
central bank plays the role of a lender of the resort in the opened economy with 
a fixed exchange rate. However, the stability of banking system is depended on 
the size of the central bank’s reserves and the exchange rate regime strength. 
On the other hand, to support domestic banks, the central bank might pursue an 
expansionary policy and keep interest rates from rising. But still, private agents 
use the additional domestic currency to deplete the central bank’s reserves. 
Therefore with limited international reserves, eventually, the central bank will 
abandon the peg. This shows how a financial crisis can transfer to a balance of 
payments crisis and caused boom-bust cycles. The further expansion of 
borrowing abroad by domestic banks creates the lending expansion and 
investing-consumption booms in the domestic economy. These booms might 
continue to widen the current account deficit and then financial markets will 
need more foreign capital to feed the trade deficit (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999:475). Moreover, the lending boom converge levels gradually in inflation 
and then cumulative real exchange rate appreciation (see 
 
3The key issue is a mismatch of assets and liabilities: a country's financial system is 
internationally illiquid if its potential short term obligations in foreign currency exceed the 
amount of foreign currency it can have access to on short notice (Change and Velasco (1998c)). 
Dornbusch(1976,1987)’s overshooting model ). Cumulative real exchange rate 
appreciation generates the expectation of exchange rate depreciation on the 
market. Change and Velasco’s model point out that the capital inflows become 
outflows and cause the collapse of the banking system causing currency crisis.4 
Finally, the last branch of the third generation models concentred on a problem 
appears in balance sheet firms as the primary source of crises. Especially, 
Krugman (1999 a, b) and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999, 2001) 
intensively investigated this topic though its connection to other 
microeconomics aspects such as fragility of the banking system and 
asymmetrical information (moral hazard). In the models, the crisis might 
happen under different exchange rate regime. The entrepreneurs obtained 
credits from two sources: domestic or foreign markets. It allowed them to mix 
short-term debt, denominated in domestic currency and long-term debt 
denominated in foreign currency. The credits amount to finance investment 
depends on firms’ wealth. And on the other hand, the firms’ wealth primarily 
determines investment and output (Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In the case of 
any economic shock, the sudden capital inflows cause an explosion in the 
domestic currency value of dollar debt and in this manner increased in foreign 
currency repayments and reduce their ability to borrow for further investments. 
Moreover the decline of investment and output implied a credit-constrain in 
economy. Further reduction of capital inflows decreases the demand for the 
domestic currency and leads to depreciation. Thus, the financial crisis cycles 
started to close circle (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001).  
 In the end, it is worth talking about Sudden –Stop Models (see Calvo 
(1998), Mendoza (2001), Mendoza and Smith (2002) and Hutchison and Noy 
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 To provide unambiguous evidence to support the theory on the causal links between currency 
and banking crises were provided in the following studies: Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999,Glick, Go 
and Hutchison (2006), Shehzad and De Haan (2008), Sulimierska (2008b). 
(2002), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Valdes (2008)). These models 
analysed a phenomenon of abrupt reduction of the capital inflows into a 
country. Before the moment of abrupt reduction it has been receiving large 
volumes of foreign capital.  But they focused on micro and macro perspective 
so they are in the middle between second and third generation models. 
 
3. Overview of empirical literature  
 
A large number of empirical studies have examined the determinants 
of currency crises, but   the empirical evidence is far from conclusive 
inference. In general, two lines of analysis can be distinguished: single-
country or multi-country. The number of multi-countries has grown rapidly 
since the beginning of 1990s (see Sulimierska (2008b)). However, these multi-
country analyses have some limitations due to attempt to exploit the higher 
variability associated with cross-country information. In that way, the 
evidence from multi-country studies is mixed and not very robust contrast to 
single-country studies (Esquivel and Larrain (1998:9)). On the other hand, the 
most of single-country studies were developed before 1990s. However, after the 
Asian Crisis academic attention moved back to single country analysis by 
investigating microeconomic fundaments such as company’s debts, 
performance of financial institutions (see Borenszten and Jong-Wha (2000)). 
In this case it is sensible to follow the first line of empirical paper due to 
this paper will examine the IMF intervention in the context of the possibility that 
this crisis was caused by the inconsistency between the exchange rate policy and 
fiscal policy. The single-country analysis developed in the beginning of 1990s. 
This analysis focused on the determinants of crises in a single country during 
periods of economic turbulence and usually tried to explain the timing of 
devaluation in a specific country based on the behaviour of several 
macroeconomic indicators (the linear discrete time models). Most of them have 
generally found strong evidence suggesting that domestic macroeconomic 
indicators play a key role in determining currency crises. Nevertheless, these 
results might be suggestive, are sometimes limited since they are obtained from 
a small number of countries during very specific situations.5  
However, both studies above provide evidence for qualitative success of 
applying first generation model (the linear discrete time models) although these 
results can be broadly discussed since the restrictive assumptions including the 
purchasing power parity (PPP), interest rate parity, and the unresponsiveness of 
the demand for real balance to currency substitution motives (see CVW (1989), 
Blanco and Garber (1986), Goldberg (1994). Both models state that domestic 
credit shocks are still expected to be the dominant force in triggering speculative 
attacks on currency. 
In briefly summarizing the first generation empirical literature is 
necessary to start with the classic representation Blanco and Garber (1986) 
model. This model analysed the movement from one fixed exchange rate to 
another and computed the one-period ahead collapse probability for the fixed 
Mexican peso exchange rate from 1973-1982. To obtain these results they 
produced the devaluation models and used the time-series estimates of the one-
period -ahead probability of devaluation that allowed them to predict the timing, 
probability of speculative attacks and forecast lower bounds for the post-collapse 
exchange rates. Blanco and Garber’s model is a version of Krugman –Flood-
Garber model. In this model, Blanko and Garber took the forward exchange rate 
as the shadow exchange, fixed exchange rate and calculation of the economic 
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 This overview neglects the empirical models of currency crisis which consider different aspect 
of another generation models: Puri, Kuan, and Maskooki (2001), Sachs, Velasco,  Tornell (1996), 
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001), Kibritcioglu,  Kose and Ugur (1999), 
Sulimierska(2008a,b). 
fundamental from the bubble model and to construct new regime of fixed 
exchange rate after currency crisis. The results of this paper showed that large 
exchange rate adjustments in Mexico were preceded by substantial increases in 
the ex-ante probability of devaluation. It is strong evidence of the first 
generation views of currency crisis; however their model replicates some aspects 
of the relatively high values prior to actual devaluation. This causes some critics 
that exchange rate policy could not acknowledge an eventual devaluation ,and  
then a crawling peg will be though be equivalent to a fixed exchange rate regime  
after speculative attack because (see Reynoso (2002b)). 
  A subsequent study along this line is CVW’s paper (1989). It is a 
similar model to Blanco and Garber’s (1986) model  with crawling exchange 
regime. On the contrary to Blanco and Garber ‘s (1986), the domestic credit is 
not followed the stochastic process. Furthermore, the central bank does not 
know the critical level of international reserve at which the exchange rate 
regime will abandon before the speculative attacks. Because of this, authorise 
assumed the reserve floor was describe by a uniform distribution with an upper 
bound as the current level of reserves and the lower bound as minus the central 
bank’s gross foreign liabilities.  The final conclusion from model is that the 
domestic credit growth strategy pursued by the Argentine government almost 
completely undermined the announced crawling peg exchange rate 
Then, Goldberg’s analysis (1994) presents the devaluation model of 
Mexican peso for fixed or crawling exchange rate regime, but it has some 
deviation from these restricted assumptions of previous papers. The author 
calculated ex-ante probability of currency crises. He attempted to predict the 
sizes of expected devaluation of Mexican peso for the period 1980 and 1986 
by generating the forecasts of lower bounds for sustainable post-collapse 
exchange rates between the Mexican peso and United States dollar. 
Nevertheless there are some modifications compare with previous papers due 
to the author used the Goldberg (1991) version of Flood and Garber’s model 
(1984) as the base of estimation model (1995). As before the domestic credit 
creation and domestic spending excess are viewed as the primary reasons for 
reserve depletion. If, in any period, expansion of domestic credit is too large to 
be absorbed by the demand for real balance, equilibrium in the money market is 
achieved in tow way. The first way is though adjustment of the exchange rate in 
a flexible exchange rate system. The way is by offsetting movements in central 
bank foreign exchange reserve stocks in controlled exchange rate system. In 
order that the discrete -time collapsing exchange rate model relies in a money 
market equilibrium condition which determines either the equilibrium exchange 
rate under a flexible exchange rate system or the endogenous path of central 
bank reserve under a controlled exchange rate system. In accordance with the 
paper’s results domestic fiscal and monetary shocks were the main forces 
contributing to speculative attacks on the Mexican peso. Furthermore, the 
result suggested that the external credit shocks played a relatively minor role in 
the onset of Mexico’s currency crises during the 1980s. Moreover, a reduction 
of domestic credit growth increases the uncertainty surrounding this growth. 
Then, there will be reduction of the size and perhaps increase the frequency of 
currency realignments which might have greatly reduced the amount of 
currency speculation against the peso between 1980 and 1986.  
Another paper is similar line such as Blanco, Garber (1986) and 
Goldberg (1994), is Pazarbaşioğlu and Ötker’s (1997). This paper examines the 
potential currency crisis in Mexico’s exchange rate regime during October 
1982- December 1994. Goldberg (1991, 1994)’s speculative attack models was 
implemented with a stochastic version of the monetary approach to exchange 
rate determination. In this model, the government and monetary authority are 
committed to maintaining the exchange rate within some form of crawling 
exchange rate regime in of a small open country. This model estimates the 
probability of devaluation to capture the systematic relationship between the 
realised regime changes and economic fundamentals. This probability evaluates 
whether speculative pressures on the currency can be accounted for by 
economic fundamentals. Formally, the one-step-ahead probability of a regime 
change can be approximated by computing the probability that the floating 
exchange rate next period will exceed the prevailing fixed exchange rate. In 
order to distinguish the determinants of the likelihood of a currency crisis or the 
timing of crisis they used the survival model. In accordance with the empirical 
findings the probability associated with all regime changes in the sample period 
can be attributed to speculative pressures in light of some deterioration in 
economic fundamentals. In addition these results suggested that the decline in 
foreign reserves, the increase in the share of short-term foreign currency-
indexed debt, and /or expansionary monetary and fiscal policies seem to be the 
main factors which determined the timing of speculative attacks Pazarbaşioğlu 
and Ötker (1997:841-845). 
In summary, most of the studies used monthly data, except for Blanco, 
Garber’s (1986). Additionally finding results from these models led to 
unequivocal conclusion-domestic macroeconomic indicators play a key role in 
determining currency crises especially the fiscal deficit and inconsistency 
with exchange rate policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Empirical part: The Russia Econometric model 
 
4.1. The Russian Case study  
 
This section provides a brief review of the Russia economic and political 
situation in the late 1990s (Appendix A Table 1) that prompts some of the 
questions addressed in the theoretical model in the next section.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 held the promise of a peaceful 
and affluent Russia. It was believed that Russia would rapidly become integrated 
into the global market place and never again be a threat to world peace.  
However, the transition from communism to a market economy, which began in 
the early 1990s, was more complex than merely an economic experiment; it also 
involved the transformation of society and of social and political structures.  As a 
consequence, Russia’s transformation challenged IMF and World Bank policies 
and planning.  In order to avoid a return to the communist system, these 
institutions advocated a shock therapy. This therapy had three main pillars: 
liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation Shleifer and Treisman (2000:100-
132). The liberalisation program was intended to allow integration with a market 
economy so most prices were freed overnight in 1992, setting in motion 
hyperinflation, and creating the problem of macroeconomic instability. In 
addition, at this time Gregory Matushin, the President of the central bank of 
Russia, explained that inflation was rising because demand exceeded supply: 
firms were unable to produce, because they did not have sufficient working 
capital.  The central bank considered that its role was to fill the gap left by the 
central planning bureau, to provide firms with cash (”supply-sider” support for 
firms through virtually unlimited cash injections). The second rounds of reforms 
were stabilisation programs to build market institutions and bring inflation down. 
However, this was a period of significant political instability.  Government 
offices were taken over by the young reformers, medium-level Communist Party 
members who were promoted to high level government positions, but who knew 
little about politics and economics Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:15-16). They 
were unable to create new democratic and economic institutions within the 
framework of the old communist and corrupt Russian environment. The last 
pillar was massive privatisation to create a new capitalist class to protect the new 
democratic capitalist structure, but, instead, it created an oligarchy.6 Within a 
year of its rebirth, Russia was in complete disarray. Inflation was out of control, 
the federal budget was quickly contracting, damaging basic public services. The 
standard of living sharply declined, and Mafia of all sorts had established 
themselves. The threat of the return of communism increased due to Yeltsin’s 
waning popularity and the rebuilding of the communist party in a new form 
under Genna (Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:16).) To an extent, all these negative 
economic and political events culminated in the currency crisis of ’’Black 
Tuesday’’, on 11th October 1994. However, the collapse of the economy allowed 
the start of a new program of mass privatisation and a successful disinflation 
program partly based on anchoring the rouble to the dollar though a crawling peg 
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 The majority of Soviet economy was thus promptly”privatized” by uncontrolled bosses whose 
sole allegiance had been to the Communist Party. The”connections”, a word synonymous with 
power and influence in the previous regimes, become a tool for private wealth accumulation. Most 
of the latter-day oligarchs started that way in these early hours of transformation. By late 1992, 
anti-market forces had regrouped around the Association of Industrialists. This association 
mobilized the managers of the huge Soviet –era conglomerates who used to be the regime’s 
backbone and beneficiaries. They were fighting back and trying to reverse the market-oriented 
measures introduced by reformers. With the active support of the Central Bank of Russia, they 
were the most dangerous force. Mass privatization shrewdly co-opted them: they were given for 
51 percentages of the shares and the possibility of buying the rest. More precisely, the personnel 
were given 51 percentages of the shares, but the managers received a significant portion of it and 
easily convinced lower rank of employees to sell theirs at “nice price”. Once their wealth, until 
then only the notional present value of expected privileges, was transformed into effective 
ownership, their interest for a reveal of market reforms disappeared and Yeltsin’s power was 
consolidated. During 1993 alone, leaving aside the oil and mineral extraction industries not yet up 
for sale, 40 percentage of Russian industry (measured in terms of employees) was privatized 
Stiglitz (2002:144-145), Ivanova and Wyplosz(2000:15-19) 
arrangement, the corridor. In July 1995, this disinflation program was adopted by 
tightening monetary policy by giving autonomy to the Central Bank of Russia 
(Sutale (1999:7), Małecki, Sławiński, Piasecki and Żuławska (2001:137-153)). In 
addition, after Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996, international optimism increased. In 
April 1996, Russian officials began negotiations to reschedule the repayment of 
the foreign debt inherited from the former Soviet Union as members of the Paris 
and London Clubs of indebted nations and international institutions became 
obligated to expand their assistance.7 Clearly, the outlook in 1997 presented 
good reasons for optimism. Russian politics had managed to establish most of 
the pre-conditions for a successful transition, but they had failed in some 
important details due to impossible political conditions. Mass privatisation is 
usually presented as an unmitigated disaster.8 However, there were many 
positive signals. Inflation was no longer a debilitating factor. The inflation rate 
for 1997 stood at 11 percentages, down from 2500 percentage in 1992. Monetary 
policy was entirely dedicated to the pursuit of disinflation, aiming at a rate of 5 
percentages by the end of 1998. The exchange rate had been brought into the 
corridor in July 1995, and was successfully kept in a narrow band between 5 and 
6 roubles to the Dollar (Appendix A Figure 3). The trade balance never posed 
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 The World Bank was prepared to provide expanded assistance of $2 to $3 billion per year.  The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to meet with Russian officials and provided aid. In 
September 1997, Russia was allowed to join the Paris Club of creditor nations after rescheduling 
the payment of over in old Soviet debt to other governments. Moreover, Russian government 
singed another agreement for debt repayment with the London Club. However, the improvement 
of international credit rating can be very questionable. For example, the Paris Club’s recognition 
of Russia as a creditor nation was based upon discussible qualifications. The one-fourth of the 
assets considered to belong to Russia was in the form of debt owed to the former Soviet Union by 
countries such as Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam. The recognition by the Paris Club was also based 
on the old, completely arbitrary official Soviet exchange rate of approximately 0.6 rubles to the 
dollar. The improved credit ratings Russia received from its Paris Club recognition were not based 
on an improved balance sheet ( Chiodo and Owyang (2002 :11), Stiglitz (2000:15-19)     
8
 In 1997, 69 percentages of enterprises were private (including foreign ownership), 9 percentages 
had mixed ownership. True, there was a heavy price to pay: appalling corporate government. Most 
firms were in the incompetent and corrupt hands of the former”red barons” more apt at seeking 
subsidies than at retooling non-competitive businesses (Ivanova, and Wyplosz (2000:17-18)). 
any threat (Appendix A Figure 4).  Oil, gas and mineral exports were virtually 
guaranteed, at least in volume. This allowed Russia to purchase western goods 
deemed superior in quality. Following liberalisation, imports had risen sharply 
while non-oil, non-mineral, non-military imports and exports were insignificant. 
Russian manufacturers were largely unable to complete orders for their own 
domestic markets, far less for foreign markets (Chiodo and Owyang (2002: 11), 
Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:17-19)). 
Some economic progress had been achieved over the period 1992-1997, 
but much remained to be done on both the structural and macroeconomic levels 
and, in some aspects, the Russian economy rapidly deteriorated after 1996 
president election. There was no doubt that one of the main reasons for Russia’s 
macroeconomic fragility was fiscal problems. The federal budget had been in 
deficit from the beginning of the transition. Local and regional government were 
not allowed to run deficits and indeed, managed to maintain a rough balance. By 
end of 1997, the situation was no better. At about 7 percent of GDP, the deficit 
was not unbearable since the domestic public debt was at zero to start with, in 
1992 (Appendix A Figure 3) (Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:16-17).  However, the 
biggest weakness in the Russian economy was low tax collection. Many firms did 
not pay taxes and the government did not pay for its purchases, which permitted 
barter transactions, especially at the regional government level Stiglitz 
(2002:152). The quantitative decline in tax revenue went hand in hand with a 
qualitative deterioration, as non-cash tax receipts (in the form of promissory notes 
–vekselya- or other non-monetary payments) reached 26 percent of taxes in 1996 
and 20 percent in 1997 Chapman and Mulino (2001:7). Additionally the majority 
of tax revenue came from taxes that were shared between the regional and federal 
governments, which fostered competition among the different levels of 
government over tax revenue distribution. Certainly, this kind of tax sharing can 
result in conflicting incentives for regional governments and lead them to help 
firms conceal part of their taxable profit from the federal government in order to 
reduce the firms’ total tax payments. In return, the firm would then make transfers 
to the accommodating regional government (a kind of barter trade). This can 
explain why federal revenues dropped more rapidly than regional revenues 
(Desai, (2000:49), Shleifer and Treisman (2000:100-149)).  
As the authorities were unable to raise adequate government revenue and 
the IMF prohibited the Central Bank of Russia from borrowing in 1995 (the 
disinflation program), the government relied on the market to pick up government 
short-term bills (GKO’s) and long –term bonds (OFZ’s), in the process attracting 
domestic and foreign investors to have access to the government securities 
market. The first debt instruments, short-term GKO, had been issued in small 
quantities in May 1993, but an efficient GKO market soon developed. At their 
lowest levels in the final quarter of 1997, the annualised yields of government 
securities averaged 25-30 percents, far higher than comparable rates abroad 
(Buchs (1999:688); Shleifer and Treisman (2000:100-149), Chiodo and Owyang 
(2002: 11), Desai, (2000:48)). The high real returns of this instrument made it 
very appealing to Russian and foreign investors, even though the later were not 
initially allowed to invest and then had to hold their assets in special S-accounts, 
which severely limited the repatriation of their earnings. In spite of the lifting of 
the earlier requirement limiting purchases of government bonds to domestic 
investors, this was not adequate to finance the Russian fiscal problem (Desai, 
(2000:49), Chiodo and Owyang, (2002:12)).Under these conditions, at the 
beginning of 1996, the government had decided to remove the limitations on the 
purchase of government securities by non-resident investors, promoting foreign 
investment, especially short-run capital in flows to Russian. So, by late 1997, 
roughly 30 percent of the GKO market was accounted for by non-residents, by 
direct contract or via the banking system. Of the CBR and Sberbank (the largest 
State Saving Bank), which held about 50 percent of GKOs, assisted the 
government by purchasing new GKO issues at the primary auctions. The 
remaining GKOs were held by the domestic commercial banks, owned by the 
oligarchs. The OFZ’s market did not develop so dynamically because of investor 
uncertainty (Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:33)). 
Secondly, there was some fragility in the banking system. Russian bank 
assets fell below that of liabilities and this weakness was often seen as stemming 
from the liability side. The most striking feature of Russian bank liabilities was a 
low and falling share of deposits, apart from the Sbenrbank (Savings Bank of the 
Russian Federation). From 1995 to 1997, deposits fell by some 11 percent, 
reaching 49 percent of overall liabilities.  Without households’ deposits going to 
the Sberbank, which absorbed some 75 percent of households’ deposits, the ratio 
of deposits to liabilities would have been much lower, well below 30 percent. 
Also, the composition of deposits changed; there was contraction in mainly long-
term deposits (time and saving deposits, including currency ones). So, the overall 
fall in deposits harmed Russian banks in as much as it reduced access to a cheap 
source of liquidity; moreover, as the public turned to more volatile forms of 
deposit, banks became more exposed to sudden liquidity shortfalls due to loss of 
confidence (Chapman and Mulino (2001:11)). However, in 1996, capital 
liberalisation allowed Russian banks to borrow more from foreign markets.  Most 
of these transactions were secured by Russian banks’ purchase of GKO on the 
domestic market and registered as a deterioration in the balance sheets of Russian 
banks as a rise in their foreign liabilities as a proportion of assets (mostly in 
domestic government securities that were to become worthless), from 7 percent of 
their assets in 1994, to 17 percent in 1997 (Desai (2000:49)).  
But the glimpse of recovery seen in 1997, when Russia became the 
lowest-risk member of the world market according to her international credit 
rating and with greater domestic stability, was not to last long. The international 
situation of the foreign market was badly hit by the East Asian crisis in the 
summer of 1997, and in November 1997, the rouble came under speculative 
attack. The Central Bank of Russia defended the currency by reducing its foreign-
exchange reserves. At the same time, non-resident holders of short-term 
government bills (GKOs) signed forward contracts with the CBR to exchange 
roubles for foreign currency, which enabled them to hedge exchange rate risk in 
the interim period.  (These forward contracts were called NDFs - non-delivery 
forward) (see Małecki, Sławiński, Piasecki and Żuławska (2001: 137-153),  
Chiodo and Owyang (2002:12)). Also, a substantial amount of the liabilities of 
large Russian commercial banks were off the balance sheets, consisting mostly of 
forward contracts signed with foreign investors (Desai (2000: 49), Chiodo and 
Owyang (2002:12)).  
The East Asian crisis created an enormous additional strain in contrast to 
the expectation that the oil demand would not fall but, rather, increase. The 
resulting imbalance between the demand and supply of oil created a dramatic fall 
in crude oil prices, to a reduction of over 40 percent in the fist six months of 1998, 
compared to average prices in 1997. An accompanying fall in nonferrous metal 
prices meant that Russia’s oil industry ceased being profitable as oil prices were 
lower than extraction costs and transportation, given the exchange rates at the 
time (Stiglitz (2002:145)). So, this other external shock hurt the Russian 
economy, especially the balance of trade and Russia’s ability to generate tax 
revenue. According to Alexashenko (1999, 2010) and Stiglitz (2002), the balance 
of trade deficit shrank five times between 1995 and mid-1998. 
At the beginning of 1998, the Russian situation began to deteriorate due to 
increasing uncertainty as investors turned their attention towards Russian default 
risk. Even when the government promised to pay back in dollars, it faced high 
interest rates (yields on dollar–denominated debt issued by the Russian 
government rose from slightly over 10 percent to almost 50 percent, 45 
percentage points higher than interest rate the U.S government had to pay on its 
Treasury bills at the time) in the market though there was a high probability of 
default.  In this situation, the Russian government wanted to promote a stable 
investment environment by submitting a new tax code to the Duma, with fewer 
and more efficient taxes, in February 1998. The new tax code was approved in 
1998, yet some crucial parts that were intended to increase federal revenue were 
ignored.  In addition, Russian officials sought IMF funding but agreement could 
not be reached.  Even though the interest rate was lower than it might otherwise 
have been many investors believed that Russia was too politically important to 
fail. The investment banks made loans to Russian, they whispered about how big 
the IMF bailout would have to be (see Chiodo and Owyang (2002: 12-14), Stiglitz 
(2002:146). 
However, by late March 1998, the political environment became worse. 
On March 23 1998, President Yeltsin fired his entire government, including Prime 
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and appointed Sergei Kiriyenko. At the same 
time, there was conflict between the executive branch, the Duma, and the CBR. 
Prompted by threats from Yeltsin to dissolve Parliament, the Duma confirmed 
Kiriyenko’s appointment on April 24 1998, after a month of struggling (Chiodo 
and Owyang (2002 :13)).  
By mid-May 1998, it was clear that the government would not be able to 
fix the situation on its own and that only an IMF loan might have restored 
confidence. On 27 May 1998, the demand for bonds had plummeted so much that 
yields were less than 50 percent so that the government failed to sell enough 
bonds at its weekly auction to refinance the debt becoming due (Appendix A 
Figure.2). The government formed an anti crisis plan, requested assistance from 
the West, and began bankruptcy proceedings against three companies with large 
debts from non-payment of back taxes. The spreading expectation of impending 
devaluation made the exchange rate for six-month forward contracts rise with 
respect to the nominal rate by as much as 24 percent in June.  From the end of 
May, the interest rate differentials between outstanding GKOs and currency–
denominated bonds widened sharply and reached some 85 percentage points in 
late June. Domestic agents consistently shifted to goods that traditionally 
represented a shelter in times of troubled foreign currency. From mid-May 1998 
on, money flows from the government securities markets to the foreign exchange 
market caused the rouble to come under attack (Chapman and Mulino (2001: 23) 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (1998:61)). The remaining GKOs were 
held by the domestic commercial banks, owned by the oligarchs, with 
considerable influence. These oligarchs’ interests were mostly in the oil and gas 
sector, publicly called for devaluation. The others, however, were mostly 
concerned by the dollar liabilities of the bank that they controlled, and they 
opposed devaluation, calling instead for an IMF bailout (Chapman and Mulino 
(2001:9-10)). 
By May, and certainly by June of 1998, it was clear Russia would need 
outside assistance to maintain its exchange rate. Because of this fear of holding 
roubles, and the lack of confidence in the government’s ability to repay its debt, 
by June 1998, the government had to pay an interest rate of almost 60 percent on 
its rouble loans (GKOs) (Appendix A Figure 2). In light of this, the CBR 
increased the lending rate again in June 1998, however, it could not stop the flight 
of non-residents from government GKO’s.  At the same time, the CBR lost its 
reserves to defend the exchange rate peg. In spite of all of the government’s 
efforts, there was widespread knowledge that loans from foreign investors to 
Russian corporations and banks were to come due by the end of September 
(Stiglitz(2002:146)).  
By mid- June, it was becoming increasingly clear that the storm would 
hit. Speculators could see how much in the way of reserves was left, and as 
reserves dwindled, betting on devaluation became increasingly a one-way bet. 
They risked almost nothing betting on the rouble’s crash. As expected, the IMF 
came to the rescue with $4.8 billion in July 1998, and a GKO swap (Stiglitz 
(2002:147)). The World Bank was also called upon to lend $ 1.5 bn for structural 
reforms because the reformers and their advisers in the IMF feared devaluation, 
believing that it would set off another round of hyperinflation. However, this 
rescue packet disappeared during the following two weeks (Stiglitz (2002: 146). 
After losing so much liquidity, the IMF assistance did not provide much relief. 
The Duma eliminated parts of the IMF-endorsed anti-crisis program, which 
eliminated the additional revenues to budget. On August 17, the government 
floated the exchange rate, devalued the rouble (Appendix A Figure. 3), defaulted 
on its domestic debt, halted payment on rouble-denominated debt (primarily 
GKOs), and declared a 90-day moratorium on payment by commercial banks to 
foreign creditors..  The terms of the GKO restructuring were announced only one 
week later. Initially, Russia offered to restructure non-residents’ frozen GKOs 
into 17 year dollar-denominated Eurobonds. The IMF tried to insist on an equal 
approach to resident and non-resident holders of GKOs, but the new Russian 
government decided to offer different restructuring schemes (see Ivanova and 
Wyplosz (2000:35)). 
4.2. Motivation for the monetary balance–of-payments model’s implementation  
The evidence from the above case study suggests of needs to re-think 
how this currency crisis could be predictable. Maybe the reason of crisis was 
simply predictable because of the wrong macroeconomic fundament typical first 
generation crisis according to Krugman‘s (1999), Ivanova and Wyplosz  (2000) 
and Süppel (2002). Certainly situation could be more complicated as many 
authors suggest. According to Chapman and Mulino (2001), Russian episode lies 
between ‘’first generation model ’’ and twin crises’’ models. In contrast Buchs 
(1999) and Desai (2000) said that the Russian financial disaster is a typical 
example of crisis contagion, although the underlying vulnerability of the economy 
was a problem which no investor could ignore like fiscal deficit or the 
vulnerability if the banking system.  Similar opinion is represented by Stiglitz 
(2002), but he emphasises that the Russian crisis was a result of an overvalued 
exchange rate, which was result of wrong IMF stabilisation program and 
contagion from the East Asian crisis. He also suggests the sharp decline in oil 
prices on which the Russian government revenue depended heavily. The most 
interesting view is presented by Gurvich and Andryakov (2002). They suggested 
of existing the ‘’hostage effect’’9 in the Russia case. Their model suggests that the 
more reserved the government was, the stronger its adverse effect of the crisis. 
This effect incorporates the problem of coronation, as do most second-generation 
models. Gaidar (1999) pointed to the political hopeless and corruption as the main 
reason of currency crisis. In contrast, Sutela (1999) suggested that it was the third 
model generation of currency crisis, which was the mostly typical financial crisis 
combination with the currency crisis. Additionally, Chiodo and Owyang (2002) 
pressed that different aspects of all models of currency crisis could be found.  
 
9
 It is a situation when a few large players dominated the capital market.  The government has lack 
of a liquidity to withstand temporary deterioration of the external environment or a speculative 
attack. The key point is the moment when the crisis hazard with the private sector. The 
government forces investors to bail out government assets, the effect under consideration maybe 
important only in the most severe crisis cases. 
As we can see, there was a very dynamic debate among the economists 
as to what were the reasons of Russian currency crisis were. It can suggest to set 
the hypothesis whether the Russian episode was the typical bad macroeconomic 
fundament crisis (first generation crisis), or maybe it was more complicated case. 
This way of analyse allows to better understand the implications of IMF 
stabilisation program in the context of Russian currency crisis. In this case it is 
correct to use the Cumby and van Wijnbergen’s (1989) monetary model of a 
balance–of-payments that had a similar length period, characteristic of date 
(monthly date) and estimates for the crawling exchange rate regime (Russia had 
the crawling band of exchange rate from July 1996 to November 1997) (Buchs 
(1999:694-696)). 
4.3. Empirical methodology 
 In almost all the derivations, the empirical methodology is followed 
Cumby and Van Wijnbergen’s (1989) model (CVW model).  However, the 
exchange regime was implemented in the model (from the crawling exchange rate 
to fixed exchange rate). As the result that the exchange rate was in a very narrow 
band in Russia (almost fixed rate) in the period under consideration (Appendix A 
Figure 3). 
 
4.3.1. The model of assumptions 
 
1. Equilibrium of money stock that at the end of each period agents change their 
holdings of real cash balances according to the money demand function 
(Appendix B -1): 
tttt nbiaqm +−=−  (1)  where ),0(~ nt Nn σ  
 
2. Uncovered interest parity:  
tttt eEeii −+= +1
* (2),  where 1+tEe  is the exchange rate  agents expected to prevail 
at the end of period t+1 given information available at the end of period t.  
3. Foreign interest rate is exogenous: ttt uii += −
*
1
*
 (3) where ),0(~ 2nt Nu σ  
4. Purchasing power parity:  
tt ep =  (4) where *tp   is exogenous and exchange rate is in the form of log, 
constant and equal to 1 ( Appendix B -2). 
5. They assumed that all money is high-powered money (Appendix B-3) and 
stable balance sheet of central bank (the net worth and government deposit are 
neglected) result that:  
)ln( ttt DRm += (5) where tR foreign assets of central bank (for e.g. foreign 
Treasuries or bonds), and tD  domestic assets of central bank (for e.g. government 
securities, loans to commercial banks). The foreign asset is presents in Russian 
rubbles (domestic currency).  
The domestic currency value of the central bank‘s foreign assets is 
affected by exchange rate fluctuations and foreign exchange market interventions. 
The domestic currency changes (e.g. te ↑) will change the value of assets 
denominated in foreign currency ( tR ↑). This gain from foreign assets as a result 
of devaluation can  be used discretely to cover the government deficit (increasing 
the value of foreign assets allows an increase in the purchasing power of home 
treasury bills through the operation of the open market -↑ domestic assets of 
central bank- therefore, the assets in balance will not change). Additionally, in 
this case, the devaluation will not allow increase in the high-money stock. 
Monetization thus indicates an increase in the domestic assets of the central bank, 
although it implies a rise in the currency value of the bank’s foreign assets. For 
that reason it is included when calculating domestic credit changes and excluded 
when estimating reserve changes. So, in this model, tR is the measure of central 
bank foreign assets and tF  is the foreign currency value of central bank foreign 
assets  ( ott eRF /=  where oe is the exchange rate in some base period). 
6. Domestic credit growth is exogenously given and it is necessary to finance the 
finance deficit:  
)1( 11 ++ += ttt gDD  (6) where 1+tg is the rate of domestic credit growth between the 
end of t and the end of t+1. 
 The financial deficit and exchange policy are independent. This assumption 
allows to examining the first generation model (linear rules in policy makers). If 
this assumption does not pass, then the multiple outcomes should be analysed (see 
Obstfeld’s (1986 a,b, 1994) model). In addition, the future domestic credit growth 
is unknown to market investors at every point in time and depends on two kinds 
of disturbances: permanent ( ttt εpipi +=+1  where ),0(~ εσε Nt ) and transitory 
stochastic ( ),0(~ δσδ Nt ) and tε  and tδ  are independent. Hence 
111 +++ += tttg δpi   (7)   
7. The central bank is assumed to have established a fixed exchange ( te ) rate 
under which the exchange rate develops as tt ee =+1 . Market investors assume that 
the fixed exchange rate will not be held by the central bank in all circumstances. 
They form some expectation about the next period’s exchange rate; agents have to 
assess the credibility of the monetary and exchange rate policy. The ability and 
willingness of the authorities to maintain a fixed exchange rate will depend 
decisively on whether that exchange rate policy is consistent with the goals of the 
authorities’ monetary and fiscal policy. Nevertheless, the fiscal policy is strongly 
determined by political and social impacts (Chapter 4.1.).  
8. A worsening public sector deficit increases the probability of an unstable 
fixed exchange rate, so we can assume that the authorities will abandon the fixed 
exchange rate and move to a floating one. The probability at the end of time t is 
that the central bank will abandon the fixed exchange rate at the end of time t+1, 
denoted as Pt. Then the probability of holding the fixed exchange rate is )1( tP− . 
Market investors can form their expectations of future exchange rates from the 
average of the current fixed exchange rate and the rate expected to materialise 
conditional on a floating exchange rate and weighted by the respective probability 
of occurrence:  
tt
f
ttt ePEePEe ∗−+∗=+ )1(1   (8) where ftEe is the exchange rate  agents expect to 
prevail if the central bank allows the exchange rate to float at the end of period 
t+1.  
Certainly, with the uncovered interest parity assumption and formation of market 
investor expectation differences between the domestic and foreign interest rate 
will increase when the credibility of the fixed exchange rate decreases tP(  ↑) and 
when the size of the depreciation expected, given that a collapse occurs, increases 
(Appendix B-4). 
9. In the terms of central bank policy, some simple criteria are employed in 
deciding whether to hold the fixed exchange rate or not. The central bank will fix 
the exchange rate as long as reserve losses do not fall to critical level R . 
Whenever reserves fall to R , then the exchange rate will be allowed to float 
(Appendix B-5). In addition, it is assumed that agents do not know R  with 
certainty so that they only estimate the prior probability in each period the 
possible value that R may have. Thus the critical level of net foreign reserve has 
some interval. Certainly, R cannot exceed the current reserve level if there is no 
currency crisis, with the aim that the upper limit is the currency level of reserve 
( UtR ). On the other hand, the lower limit for the critical level of net foreign 
reserves is much more difficult to pinpoint. In this model, CVW’s assumption of a 
lower critical level of foreign reserves as CVW (1989) was incorporated. This 
assumption allows that the central bank might have negative net foreign reserves 
which were a case of Russia.  Foreign assets exceeded foreign liabilities 
throughout most of the period (June 1995 to October 1998).  After the crisis, 
negative levels of net foreign reserves were notable, so that the assumption is 
reasonable (Appendix A Figure 1). In addition, CVW assume that additional 
foreign credit will not available during a crisis and only become available after a 
policy reform.  The lower limit on the possible critical value for net reserves will 
be minus the central bank’s currency gross foreign liabilities )( LtR . 
  Apart from other factors on which the central bank’s decisions may 
depend and which can be considered more complex than only assuming some 
critical reserve level (Appendix B-6). In the monetary balance model, the most 
important matter for market investors is the money supply. Therefore, money 
supply mainly impacts on real exchange rates (which can indicate the pressure on 
the exchange rate policy via domestic prices) and the change in domestic credit is 
exogenous so that the market agents only worry about the level of reserves.  As 
only reserve levels can help to hold the fixed exchange rate, the result is that 
agents do not care about other factors that can impact on the central bank’s 
decisions. Obviously, the uncertainty about the level of reserve at which central 
bank makes the decision of changing the exchange rate policy purpose, is some 
way of modelling uncertainty about monetary policy the decision rules. 
4.3.2. Devaluation model 
Firstly, this combination of eq. (1), (2), (4), (8) allows the formation of 
market investor expectations to be taken into consideration assuming equilibrium 
in the money market, thus giving (Appendix B-7): 
tt
f
ttttt neEePbibaem +−+−=− ][*** *  (11) 
In accordance with eq.(11),  money demand depends essentially on  three 
economic  components: the credibility of holding a fixed exchange rate 
( ** tiba − ), the probability of a floating exchange rate( tP ) and the size of the loss 
by domestic currency holders due to devaluation )( tft eEe − . The equation (11) is 
the result of using the international parity condition under uncertainty where the 
probability of the existing floats exchange ( tP ) is the main measure of this 
uncertainty. 
Secondly, the central bank can control the level of commercial bank 
reserves through its instruments (like required reserves and reserve requirement) 
so the amount of money in circulation depends on the domestic and foreign assets 
of the central bank. Certainly the central bank does not want to lose its foreign 
reserves to the same extent that the model of collapse probability requires for only 
concentrating on the growth of domestic credit ( 1+tg ). In other words, the 
probability ( tP ) is at the end of the period when the central bank will abandon the 
fixed exchange rate, at the end of time t+1, depends on the probability that the 
financial deficit will increase sufficiently (thereby domestic credit). While 1+tg)  is 
defined as the smallest realisation of domestic credit growth that causes reserve to 
fall to R at the end of period t+1 (CVW (1989:119)), where 1+tg) is held and the 
central bank keeps the policy of fixed exchange rates depends on the authorities 
noting that reserves have met the critical value and, so will announce at the end of 
t+1 that the exchange rate will float in the next period t+2. In this case, tP  =1, and 
in this manner, money equilibrium given by the eq.(10) (Appendix B-8,9): 
112
*
111 )ˆ(ˆ ++++++ +−∗−∗−=− tttttt neeEbibaem  (12) 
where ))ˆ1(ln(ˆ 111 +++ +∗+= ttt gDRm  is the log of the money supply at the end of 
period t+1 given that collapse of the fixed exchange rate occurred at the end of 
period t+1 and given that 1ˆ +tg  is continued,  2ˆ +teE  is the expected  floating 
exchange rate at period t+2 after the currency collapse and   1+te = 1+te  = te . 
In order to calculate the probability of the collapse of the fixed exchange 
rate, I have to provide a model for  1ˆ +tg  by specifying 2ˆ +teE . 
The rational expectation of agents was assumed and exchange rate is 
floating, the money demand function was used eq. (12) to obtain 2ˆ +teE : 
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From assumption (3) we can see that * 1*1 +++ = titt iiE  for *ti >0 (15), then we get: 
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Equation (16) is different from the adequate equation in CVW’s results (eq.6). 
According to these mathematical calculations, it seems that CVW’s model 
required additional amends the differences between the models are the lack of 
random error terms in my model (Appendix B-10). 
Taking Muth’s (1960) assumption of the stochastic structure of domestic credit 
growth ( tg ), the optimal forecast of future domestic credit growth is obtained by:  
it
i
i
tt ggE −
∞
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+ ∑−=
0
1 )1( λλ (17) where λ relies on the constant variance of the 
permanent and transitory stochastic disturbance of domestic credit growth (from 
assumption (7) of the model). Furthermore, equation (17) is given for 
Ttt gE + where T∈(1, +∞) but in order to simplify the notation, we can use: 
tTtt ggE =+   
To compute eq. (16), its last term has to be calculated.  In addition from 
assumption (6) there is: ( )22121 lnˆ ++++++++ += itittitt DREmE   
We know that after the collapse of the fixed peg, the exchange rate will 
float freely, with the result that reserves will stay constant at R. In that way, I can 
compute:  
( )( )( ) ( )[ ]23211121 1...11ˆ1lnˆ ++++++++++ +++++= ittttttitt ggggDREmE  (18) 
Then, by using the first-order approximation of the Taylor series, I can calculate  
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If we assume that 1ˆ +tg  is the smallest increase in domestic credit to cause 
the collapse of the fixed exchange rate, to the same extent, by taking the 
expectations conditions of  1ˆ +tg ,we get  the weighted average of expectation  
based on information from the last period of domestic credit growth  and drawn 
domestic credit growth 1ˆ +tg : 11 ˆ)1( ++ ∗−+∗= ttt ggg λλ . From eq.(19), we obtain 
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Afterwards, I can use the expression above to compute the unknown terms 
in eq.(16). Thus we can obtain: 
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Combining eq. (16),  (12) and (21)  gives (Appendix B-11): 
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Compare to CVW’s model, (eq.(8))  the sign before the a   and * 1+tbi is the 
opposite in my calculations but this sign is consistent with economic theory (the 
international interest rate has to have a negative impact on the demand for 
money).  As can be seen from the equation above, 1ˆ +tg  cannot be directly 
computed, therefore 1ˆ +tg  depends on unknown parameters for agents at time t+1 
like: * 1+ti  and the money demand disturbance 1+tn .  The aim of directly computing 
1ˆ +tg  numerically requires finding the value probability tP at the end of t of the 
collapse at the end of period t+1:  
)ˆ( 11 ++ ≥ ttt ggP (23)   
From assumption (7) ),(~ 211 σ++ tt gIIDg it can obtained 
222
δpi
σσσ += (24). In whatever manner, R  is unknown and 1+tg  is a function of 
it, so to the same extent the collapse probability cannot be computed by 
integrating the density for 1+tg  but we can firstly reckon the probability of 
collapse conditional on R  and then integrate the possible value that R may take 
on (CVW (1989:121)). Hence we obtain: 
[ ]∫ ++− −Φ−∗−=
U
t
L
t
R
R
tt
U
t
L
tt RdggRRP ))/ˆ(1()( 111 σ  (25)  
The combining of eq.(25) and eq. (22) will enable the collapse probability 
to be computed and give a full solution for the model. 
 
4.3.3 General description of the estimate procedure. 
 
In order to reckon the probability of the collapse of the fixed exchange 
rate, the estimating procedure was divided into two parts. Firstly, the calculation 
of the value of parameters will be made such as parameters of money demand 
functions: a, b and nσ    eq. (1) with assumption (4) that tt ep = , the parameters in 
the money forecasting rule: λ and σ2 eq. (17), and the variance of the changes in 
the foreign interest rate (Appendix B Table 2). The computation of the parameters 
of monetary demand (eq. 10) required that it was sensible to use instrumental 
variables to eliminate the potential endogenous effect of the domestic interest rate. 
According to CVW’s paper, there were two instrumental variables: foreign 
interest rates (eq. 3) and constant. (see CVW (1989:121)). The residuals from the 
monetary demand equations were investigated to examine the phenomenon of 
autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity between them. For instance, in CVW’s 
model, they examine the hypothesis of autocorrelation by using tests based on 
MA(n) process. In this model the process AR(n) was  investigated instead of 
MA(n). The reason is that MA(n) can be converted to the AR(n) and MA(n) as the 
finished process of AR(n).  The hypothesis of autocorrelation was estimated by 
using the test based on AR(n) process. Then an assumption (3) in the theoretical 
model (eq. (3)) was analyzed by using the Dickey- Fuller test. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, this means that the foreign interest rate followed a random 
path (Appendix B Table 3): ttt uii += −* 1*   where ),0(~ 2nt Nu σ  
Lastly, the parameter of the forecasting rule for domestic credit growth λ 
was calculated. CVW simplified the calculation by introducing the definition of 
1+tυ  as a one-period forecast error for domestic credit growth realisation at the end 
of period t+1.  1+tυ  is from  111 +++ += ttt Egg υ   (26),  and with the forecasting rule for 
domestic credit growth (17), they obtained ttttt ggEgE ∗−+∗= −+ )1(11 λλ (27). 
 The first part of equation (27) tt gE 1−∗λ came from the formation of rules 
of expectation where past expectation formation has an impact on future 
expectation. The second part tg∗− )1( λ  comes from the eq. (17) when i =0. 
From eq. (27) and (26) they derived: tt gg −+1  = tt υλυ ∗−+1 (28). 
  By assuming that all information is available to market investors and 
market agents are rational, they calculated the forecast for domestic credit 
realisation which contained past forecast errors, so all one-period-ahead forecast 
errors are uncorrelated. In accordance with eq. (28) the variance and first auto-
covariance of the first difference in the growth rate of domestic credit was 
calculated: tt gg −+1  as 
22)1( υσλ−  and 2υλσ− , respectively. However, the variance 
formula was different compare to CVW’s model (Appendix B-12). By using the 
sample estimates of variance and the auto-covariance of the first difference in 
domestic credit, I computed the λ  by using the combination of these formulae.  
When I obtained all the necessary parameters to calculate 1ˆ +tg  in eq. (22), 
I could derive the formula for 1ˆ +tg  by transformations of eq.(22) which depended 
only on the unknown R . Then, by using this formula, I computed the integer of 
eq. (25) with respect to the level of foreign reserve and in that way, obtained the 
probability of the collapse of the fixed exchange rate. 
 
4.4. The data and explanatory variables 
 
Application of this model to the Russian experience in the late 1990s 
requires estimates from the money demand equation, followed by those for 
domestic credit, foreign capital shocks. The description of the specific data series 
used for the calculations is in Appendix C Table 1. In my analysis, two different 
data sources were implemented in this analysis: IMF statistics (IFS- International 
Financial Statistics) and the Monthly Bulletin of the Central Bank of Russia 
(Central Bank of Russia: Monthly Bulletin).  Since both datasets have their 
strengths and weaknesses, both were used in my empirical analysis in order to 
check the robustness of the results. My model consisted of monthly observations 
from December 1995, to December 1998. The choice of this period was due to it 
being one of the most stable in political and economic terms - after the 
establishment of the autonomy of the Central Russian Bank, incorporating the   
disinflation program, and several official confiscations of population cash 
holdings in January 1991, July 1993 (see Appendix A Table 1 and section 3.1).  
Unfortunately, the monetary base in the Russian case was no recorded in this date. 
Approximations were implemented - M1 and M2.  As a result, the method of 
calculation in comparison with CVW (1989)’s paper was changed. Moreover, 
data from the consolidation balance sheet of the banking system (the monetary 
authorities -central bank- plus the commercial banks) was implemented. 
 
4.5. Empirical implementation and results  
 
In this section, the discussion is about an estimation of the time series of 
the collapse probability for the Russian fixed exchange rate that lasted from 
December 1995 to January 1998. Firstly, the estimations of the money demand 
function, assumptions about the random path of interest rates were presented and 
then calculations of the parameter in the forecasting rules for domestic credit 
growth, and then the results of probability calculations were discussed. There are 
two different set of approximations for the monetary base (M1 and M2) from two 
data sources (IFS and CBR). Because of that four sets of probability result were 
analysed (Appendix C Figure 1-4).  
All the estimates for money demand looked reasonable (Appendix C 
Table1), the sign and size of parameters were consistent with economy theory and 
the empirical analysis of money demand (Gerlach-Kristen (2001:55-554)). 
However, for the IFS data, there was the problem of heteroshedasticity, but an 
examination of the residuals did not show any problem with the autocorrelation 
(Appendix C: Table 1). To reduce the problem of heteroshedasciticy, White’s 
matrix was used. In estimating the base money demand parameters in equation (1) 
with assumption (4) any technique with instrumental variables were not employed 
due to the Hausman –Wu tests for the two instruments (constant term and foreign 
interest rate) and one instrument (foreign interest rate) rejected the null 
hypothesis.  In the case of the IFS data, it seemed that it did not have to take 
account of potential endogeneity problems.  
On the other hand, these estimates of the CBR data (Appendix C: Table 1) 
suggest some problems with autocorrelation and heteroshedasticity. Firstly, the 
instrumental variables were implemented because of a potential endogeneity 
problem. A wrong sign for the coefficient before the interest rate was obtained. 
This suggests that there is problem with the omitted variables such as income or 
approximations of inflation, or there is a problem with the default risk.  However, 
to obtain a more detailed picture of the Russian crisis and to simplify the analysis, 
the assumption was implemented that these results are as good as the results from 
using the IFS data.  In addition, the residuals from the money demand function 
were calculated so that assumption ),0(~ nt Nn σ in eq. (1) is correct.   
According to the results of the estimates for IFS, any problems with 
autocorrelation by using the Durbin-Watson d-statistic and Durbin’s alternative 
test for autocorrelation were not discovered. The interesting and useful aspects of 
these tests is that although the null hypothesis was originally derived for an AR(p) 
process (for Durbin-Watson test it is AR(1)), these tests are powerful against 
MA(p) processes as well. Due to this serendipitous result, the MA(p) and AR(p) 
are locally equivalent alternatives under the null hypothesis. The only problem 
was heteroscedasticity, but the correlation using White’s matrix allows the 
assumption about the residual from the money demand equation ),0(~ nt Nn σ  to 
be upheld.    
The next step was to investigate the assumption about the random path of 
interest rates. The modified Dickey-fuller t test proposed by Graham, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996) was implemented. This Dickey-Fuller unit root test allowed 
finding that the coefficient of *
1−t
i is equal to one (the null hypothesis:  it is not a 
static process). The null hypothesis of the unit root in the foreign interest rate is 
not rejected at a reasonably significant level of 5 percentages, the same extent at 
which the foreign interest rate is assumed to be correct (Appendix C, Table 2).  
Additionally, both tests of autocorrelation for the first difference of i* were also 
carried out and yielded no evidence of autocorrelation.   
The last thing before computing the integral of eq. (25), was the 
computation of λ.  Using the sample estimate of variance and the first auto-
covariance of the first difference in domestic credit (Table 1) obtained λ = 
0.43946 for IFS data and respectively for CBR data λ = 0.43845.  In order to 
simplify all the calculations, one value of λ = 0.44 for both sets of data was 
used.10 
 
  
 
 
10
 The root of the quadratic was chosen that is less than one in absolute value in order to insure 
stability of eq. (17). 
Table 1 
Date Source The sample variance of the 
first difference in domestic 
credit 22)1( υσλ−  
First auto-covariance of the first 
difference in domestic credit 
2
υλσ−  
IFS 33.7447 -18.3174 
CBR 33.744 -18.3162 
Source: My own calculations based on Table 2 and 3 from Appendix C. 
 
The series of one-step devaluation probabilities for the Russian fixed 
exchange rate was calculated in the followed way. In estimating the collapse 
probabilities, the equation was solved by substituting the parameter estimates 
above and the data associated with each observation for four different sets of data 
to obtain an estimate of the critical values for domestic credit growth in each 
period. The residuals parameters were ignored, which appeared in eq. (22) 
because this residual behaviour is treated as white noise. Then eq. (25) was 
integrated to get the probability. As this integration from eq. (25) could only be 
computed by using the numerical integration,  CVW used the Simpson’s rule- the 
trapezoidal rule. In this paper eq.(25) was also computed  by using the trapezoidal 
rule (Appendix B-13). 
The probability estimates (Appendix C: Figure 1-4) look quite reasonable, 
both in the estimated magnitude of the probability (interval 0-1) and in their 
behaviour over time (Appendix A, Chapter 3.1) Estimates for the collapse 
probability were also found, along with domestic credit growth (cumulative 
growth since the end of 1995) (Appendix C: Figure 1-4). These tables suggest that 
the permanent increase in domestic credit growth brought about the loss of 
confidence in the fixed exchange rate (Chapter 3.3 eq. (22) and (25)). In other 
words, the credibility of the policy for a fixed exchange rate was undermined even 
when the authorities said that the fiscal and domestic credit policies were 
consistent with the exchange rate. In addition, these results also indicate that 
confidence was never fully restored and that just prior to the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate in 1998, the credibility of the fixed exchange regime was extremely 
low. The estimated probability was quite high through all the period except at the 
beginning and middle of 1996. During this period there was a strong disturbance 
in the probability, which could have been caused by changes in the fiscal and 
monetary policy (changes in the exchange corridor between January and June)( 
Buchs (1999:694-696)). In the middle of 1997, domestic credit growth exceeded 
50 percent (according to IFS data, and 29 percent in CBR data) and the collapse 
probability started to permanently increase. The cumulative point was at the end 
of 1998, when 78 percent (according to IFS, and 65 percent in CBR data) 
expansion in domestic credit growth undermined the credibility of the announced 
fixed exchange rate mechanism and the collapse probability rose above 90 percent 
in August 1998, for all four figures. To the same extent, the empirical findings 
suggest that the probability associated with regime changes in August 1998 was 
mainly attributable to the speculative pressure in the light of deterioration in 
economic fundamentals (the first generation model). In line with expectations, the 
probability of devaluation was found to be in the increased levels of central bank 
credit to the banking system. The increase fiscal deficit and the reduction in 
foreign exchange reserves were also linked to the probability of devaluation.  
5. Implication of IMF’s intervention  
After the devaluation of the rouble in 1998, the economy experienced its 
first significant growth, which was very surprising.  This was because Russia is an 
exporter of natural resources and the devaluation of the exchange rate improved 
export conditions and economic growth (Appendix A Figure 4.). Certainly, this 
effect was in the short term. However, it can illustrate the issue about the 
importance of the IMF program. Throughout the 1990s, Russia operated under the 
auspices and close scrutiny of a Fund (support and stabilisation program). 
Another question is how it could happen that the IMF did not recognise that 
Russia was almost typical of a first generation crisis through some aspect of other 
generation models (Chapter 4.1. and 4.5). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was under ‘shock therapy’, which 
was strongly promoted by IMF advisors. According to this plan, it was reasonable 
to remove the central plan with the decentralisation market system, and secondly, 
to replace public ownership with private property, and eliminate or at least reduce 
the distortions by the liberalisation of trade. To the same extent, liberalisation and 
stabilisation were two of the pillars of the radical reforms strategy. The rapid 
privatisation was the third pillar.  In addition, the IMF supported international 
loans to Russia (Stiglitz (2002:136-140)). The SDR loaned 2.8 billion dollars 
since 1992 up to 1994 but, as the first tranche of loans, they did not carry 
mandatory programs. Then, after the economic problem in 1994, the IMF gave 
standby credit of $ 6.8 billion to improve the reforms of the monetary policy and 
improve fiscal policy tightness. However, the IMF did not even suggest using the 
exchange rate as an anchor; it merely supported the Russian decision to adopt the 
‘corridor’, the crawling peg. The IMF’s second large-scale program came in the 
run up to 1996 election.  However, the conditions after the reforms were quite 
vague and, as matters grew worse, the government did not seem to realise the 
seriousness of the situation. It concentrated its efforts on improving the budget, 
with no positive results.  A new program was agreed upon in July 1998 when the 
crisis was already under way (Ivanovo and Wyplosz (2000:4)). The government’s 
publicly stated strategy, the July Package, contained three main elements: a 
radical tightening of the federal budget intended to solve once and for all 
persistent fiscal imbalances, an increase in international reserves, the lengthening 
of the debt maturity to reduce vulnerability arising from the short-term structure 
of domestic debt. The fiscal part of the package aimed at improving tax 
collection, reducing tax arrears, establishing treasury control on budgetary 
expenditure and cutting federal expenditure commitments. In addition, the 
government pledged to submit to the ‘Duma’ wishes. The IMF decided to 
increase its financial support in 1998 by $ 11.2 billion, $ 4.8 billion of which were 
immediately disbursed with the explicitly stated aim of increasing foreign 
reserves. Another part of the July package was the GKO swap (Ivanova and 
Wyplosz(2000:29)). All these procedures, however, did not bring improvement to 
the Russian situation. Certainly, it suggests some errors within the IMF program.  
One of the most discussed reforms is Russia’s adoption of the principle of 
mass privatisation (Chapter 4.1).  Speed was seen as essential for the reform 
process to establish a new architecture for the market so that it ignored many 
important aspects. The high inflation after freeing prices in 1992, wiped out the 
savings of most Russians. There were not enough people in the country that had 
the money to buy the enterprises being privatised. Even if they could have 
afforded to buy the enterprises, it would have been difficult to revitalise them, 
given the high interest rates and lack of financial institutions to provide capital 
(see Shleifer and Treisman (2000)). So, privatisation was carried between the old 
communist political friends who used their influence to garner assets worth 
billions, after paying only a pittance. Also, most of the new owners of firms were 
the old managers. They did not know how to operate in the new environment so 
that they focused on what they could get out of the firm in the next few years. In 
addition, the IMF concentrated mainly on privatisation, giving short shrift to 
competition law (Stiglitz (2002:155)). 
Another issue was the lack of market institutions to control the legal and 
regulatory frameworks. In soviet Russia, everything was organised according to 
the central plan, although this system allowed for co-operation between the 
managers of firms and central and local politicians in some respects. These 
activities were necessary for the functioning of the Social economy. Therefore, in 
communist Russia circumvention of the law, if not breaking it outright, became 
part of the way of life, a precursor to the breakdown of the rule of law, which was 
to mark the transition. Nevertheless, the market economy led to corruption in 
Russia (Stiglitz (2002:138-139)). 
Thirdly, the IMF focused mostly on macroeconomic aspects, and 
disregarded issues of poverty, inequality, and social capital. The erosion of social 
capital (e.g. corruption) created an environment, which was not conducive to 
investment, economic growth and fiscal revenues (Stiglitz (2002:160-161)). 
Fourthly, the core criticism of the IMF’s program was the repeated support 
for the overvalued fixed exchange rate policy and it never recommended the 
flotation of the ruble.  However, the IMF worried that the devaluation of the 
rouble would set off a round of inflation (see IMF(1998)). One view was that the 
rubble was overvalued, the result of an excessively tight monetary policy which 
was strangling Russian firms (Chapman, Mulino (2001:24)). Another view was 
that the rubble was at about its equilibrium value and that Russian firms would 
only be able to compete when they retooled. The current account was never in 
deficit because Russia was a victim of the Dutch disease, but that does imply 
overvaluation (Wyplosz, Halpern(1997:430-461), Ivanova and  Wyplosz 
(2000:23)). Hence, the July packet came under heavy discussion, especially the 
GKO-swap (Stiglitz (2002), Ivanova and Wyplosz (2001), Gurvich, 
Andryakov(2002)). This was exactly what the Mexican authorities did in 1994, a 
move fully recognized as deeply mistaken, possibly the main reason for the 
Mexican crisis a few weeks later (Wyplosz,Yudaeva (1998)). 
In May 1998, speculators could see how much reserve was left, and as 
reserves dwindled, betting on devaluation became increasingly a one-way bet. 
They risked almost nothing betting on the rouble’s crash (Stiglitz(2002: 147)). 
After the impact of the Asian crisis, it was obvious that the IMF rescue had 
caused the multi-billion dollar gamble.  The IMF could not ignore the fact that its 
actions were technically wrong and practically hopeless. The most plausible 
answer is that the IMF acted under intense political pressure. When in late May 
1998, President Yeltsin personally asked his Western counterparts (Clinton, Kohl 
and Blair) for emergency financial aid, President Clinton publicly promised his 
support for IMF and World Bank loans, but in the following G-7 finance ministers 
meeting in early June, did not make any firm commitment (Ivanova, Wyplosz 
(2000:31-32)).   
  
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated the events in Russia that led up to a currency crisis 
and debt default and the IMF policies intended to avert them. There are three 
generations of currency crises model. The first generation model said that the 
currency crisis happened due to inconsistencies between government policy 
(fiscal and monetary policy) and the exchange rate regime. To some extent, the 
moment of currency crisis can be predicted.  The second group of models prove 
that crisis can happen even if the macroeconomic fundamentals are correct. These 
models point to different reasons for the crisis like investors’ expectations of the 
future government policy (the second generation model) or the wrong 
microeconomic fundamentals (the third generation model).  
As suggested in this paper, the hypothesis that Russia crisis was like a 
typical first generation model, the underlying vulnerability of the economy was a 
problem, which no investor could possibly ignore. In order to analysis this, 
CVW’s (1989) Argentinean monetary model of the balance –of-payments was 
adopted. In this model, agents observe the domestic credit policies of the 
authorities and forecast future domestic credit policies on the basis of 
observations (Chapter 4.3.1 eq. (12)). The model can provide each period with the 
degree of probability that in the next period the authorities will abandon the fixed 
exchange rate regime. Once this equation was obtained, the model was applied to 
the Russian fixed exchange rate from the end of 1995 to the end of 1998.  The 
empirical results were quite plausible. It was found that since 1997, the domestic 
credit growth increase had gradually undermined confidence in the fixed 
exchange rate. Eventually, the cumulative point was at the end of 1998, when the 
collapse probability was above 90 percent, so this crisis could have been predicted 
by the theory.  
These results focused attention on the IMF’s intervention in the context of 
this crisis. If the Russian episode reflected the so-called first generation model, 
the problem could have been solved only by deep changes in fiscal structure.  It 
could not have helped, in this situation, to add another tranche of international 
loans. These loans could only have postponed the time of the crisis by few weeks 
or months, which are exactly what, happened. In addition, it suggests that the 
fiscal and monetary reforms which were imposed in 1995 and earlier, were only 
so in appearance. The financing of the government deficit and public debt was not 
directly though the CBR, as in 1994, but through the banking system and financial 
foreign market (e.g. NDF contract). There were intense political concerns in the 
Russian situation that spread well beyond the economic and financial spheres.  
The July package, in particular, can be considered as a typically political decision. 
Certainly, the transition from communism to a market economy was not easy but 
extremely difficult if there was no strong domestic political support for the new 
reforms. In this context, the IMF policy in Russia was very difficult to carry out. 
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IMF-International Monetary Fund 
CBR-The Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
IFS- IMF statistics (IFS- International Financial Statistics) 
EMS-European Monetatry System 
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Appendix A-Case study 
 
Table 1.  The description of Russian economic and political situation (July 1995 to December 1998) 
 
July 1995      The autonomy of the Central Bank of Federation Russia. 
1996      The capital liberalisation for non-residents. 
Negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs for repayment of Soviet debt begin. 
1997 Trade surplus moving toward balance. Inflation around 11 percent. Oil selling at $23/barrel. Analysts predict better credit ratings for Russia. Russian 
banks increase foreign liabilities. Real wages sagging. Only 40 percent of workforce being paid fully and on time. Public-sector deficit high. 
September/October 
1997 
Negotiations with Paris and London Clubs completed. 
November, 1997 
 
November 11, 1997 
Non-resident hold of GKO’s signed forward contracts with CBR in anticipation of a decision in the rubble following the Collapse of Asian 
crisis.Asian crisis causes a speculative attack on the rubble 
CBR defends the rubble, losing $6 billion 
December 1997  Year ends with 0.8 percent growth 
Prices of oil and nonferrous metal begin to drop. 
February 1998  
 
New tax code submitted to the Duma. 
IMF funds requested. 
March 23, 1998 Yelstin fires entire government and appoints Kiriyenko. 
Continued requests for IMF funds. 
April 1998  Another speculative attack on the rubble. 
April 24, 1998. Duma finally confirms Kiriyenko’s appointment 
Early May 1998  
 
Dubinin warns government ministers of impending debt crisis, with reporters in the audience. 
Kiriyenko calls the Russian government “quite poor.” 
May 19, 1998  
 
CBR increases lending rate from 30 percent to 50 percent and defends the rubble with $1 billion. 
Mid May 1998 Lawrence Summers not granted audience with Kiriyenko. Oil prices continue to decrease. 
May 23, 1998  IMF leaves Russia without agreement on austerity plan. 
May 27, 1998  
 
CBR increases the lending rate again to 150 percent. 
Summer 1998 Russian government formulates and advertises anti-crisis plan. 
July 20, 1998  IMF approves an emergency aid package (first disbursement to be $4.8 billion). 
August 13, 1998  Russian stock, bond, and currency markets weaken as a result of investor fears of devaluation; prices diminish. 
August 17, 1998  Russian government devalues the rubble, defaults on domestic debt, and declares a moratorium on payment to foreign creditors. 
August 23-24, 1998. Kiriyenko is fired 
September 2, 1998  The rubble is floated. 
December 1998  Year ends with a decrease in real output of 4.9 percent 
Sources: Stiglitz (2002) , Shleifer and Treisman (2000), Desai, (2000), Chapman and Mulini (2001), Abbigail Chiodo and Owyang (2002), Ivanova and Wyplosz(2000), Sutale 
(1999),  Małecki,  Sławiński, Piasecki and Żuławska (2001), Shleifer and Treisman (2000:100-149)), Sulimierska (2008b) 
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 Appendix B –Methodology 
1. The money demand function )(Md  like that:  
 
),( iyfMd =  
 
 where y (the real income) and i (one or more nominal interest rates). I use the 
nominal interest rate because return on bonds (or deposits) is equal to  i - pi 
where pi - rate of inflation, i nominal interest rate on bonds (or on deposits), 
return of holding money is 0 - pi so the total cost of  holding the money is –i. 
Money market is in the equilibrium then:  
 
MdQMs t =/   
 
 where tQ  level of prices, Ms  money supply . On the whole the long-run level 
of real money balances (demand for money model) is specified by two above 
equations. Furthermore log form was used in order to simplified the form and 
integration, to the extent the long-run money demand can be estimated in this 
manner 
 
 ttt nyQMs +++= 210 )ln()/ln( βββ  
 
 where ty  - real income and ti  - a  short-term interest rate. The log form has been 
used except for the interest rate (semilog form) therefore is better approximation 
simply to use the level of the interest rate in an equation instead of the log of the 
rate. In additional in this model there is assumption about the full employment, 
so that I neglected the output in the estimation model. Of course this 
assumption can be very strong, especially in the case of transition country like 
Russia. In order to estimate the long run demand for money I can use 
 
tttt nbiaqm +−=−  (1), 
 
 where all variables are in log expect for interest rate (small letter means log 
form of variables). 
2. The theory of   absolute purchasing power parity states that the  nominal 
exchange rate between  different currencies is equal the ratio of the  different 
countries’ price levels )/( * ttt ppe = . This equation is not result of 
unchangeable of real factor (for e.g. tastes, relative productivity, accumulated 
external net asset position, nation’s budget constraint) in long run equilibrium 
of  constant real exchange rate like relative PPP but this asserts that price levels 
are equalised across countries once they are converted in the same currency 
(This assumption is much more stronger). In this way the PPP theory indicates 
that a fall in a currency’s domestic purchasing power (level of domestic price 
will increase) will be connected with a proportional currency depreciation in the 
foreign exchange market. PPP thus asserts that all countries’ price level is equal 
when measured in terms of the same currency. A key ingredient in the logic 
behind absolute PPP is the law of one price ( Krugman and Obstfeld (2009:389-
395), Burda and Wyplosz (1997:206-208). 
3. High-powered money (monetary base, central bank money) is the sum of 
currency held by the non-bank public (currency in circulation) and bank reserve 
(commercial bank reserve: represents the fraction of deposits that commercial 
banks decide to hold as reserve) (see Gordon (1990:514), Burda and Wyplosz( 
1997: 219-220) 
4. From eq. (8) and eq. (2) we obtain:  
 
)(**)1(* tftttttftttt eEePeePEePii −=−−+=−  (9) 
 
5. This assumption, comes from Krugman (1978), Flood and Garber(1984)’s 
papers, is that the central bank will abandon fixed exchange rate when reserves 
fall zero. In addition Dornbush (1987) assumed some  positive critical level of 
reserve but Buiter (1986) and Obstfelt (1986) allowed to exist the negative net 
reserve due to  the foreign lends. However, I decided to use the Dornbush’s 
assumption in modelling currency crisis in Russia. According to IFS Russian 
date (Appendix A Figure 1), almost all estimation period (June 1995to October 
1998) the foreign assets to exceed the foreign liabilities.     
6. This model does not consider the aspect of game between the authorities and 
market agents (Obsfeld (1986), (1996), Eichengreen, Wyplosz and Rose(1997)) 
and problem of  the moral hazard and asymmetrical information in banking  
system (Krugman (1999), Aghion,Bachetta and Banarjee (2000, 2001)).   
7.  From eq. (1), eq. (2) and eq.(4) we get:  
 
tttttt neEeibaem +−+−=− ][* *  (10). 
  Then eq. (10) and eq.(9) will give:  
 
( )[ ] ttftttttttfttttt neEePibaneePEePibaem +−+−=+−−++−=− *** ]*)1(*[*  
(11) 
 
8.  In this model xˆ means the value of some variables x given that a collapse 
has happened and given that the critical value for domestic credit growth is 
realised. Moreover, the date from balance sheet of Central Bank provide that  
foreign and domestic assets tt DR +  have to be equal to Central Bank liabilities 
(High-powered money = tt DcC +   where tC  currency held by the non-bank 
public (currency in circulation), tDc  - bank reserve (commercial bank reserve). 
When tg  increase so tD ↑( from eq.(6)), than monetary base will increase, 
Central Bank, in order to allow not increase money in circle(in other worlds 
increase the pressure on exchange rate), will pull the domestic credit by 
decreasing the foreign reserve (e.g. open market transaction).    
9. ttt EvvE =+1  is the expectation operator which base on the given information  
at the period t+1 ( on other words on the given information at the previous 
period than variable tv  ), on the other hand tt vE 2+  is the expectation operator 
which base on the given information  at the period t+2. 
10. By using eq. (13) and (14) there is: 
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From eq (15) * 1*1 +++ = titt iiE  for *ti >0 we can obtain: 
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 and from assumption (1) ),0(~ nt Nn σ , thus we have:   
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10. Eq.(16) was  
corrected in eq.(22) (in Cumby and van Wiinbergen’ model, eq. 6 is corrected 
by eq.(8). 
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eq(22). 
 
12. According to Cumby and Van Wijnbergen’s model, the definition of variance 
was:  
 
[ ]22 )()())([()( ttttt yEyEEyyEyyEyVar −=−−= .  
 
In this model, the variance was calculated: =ty  tt gg −+1 = tt υλυ ∗−+1 , 
υσυ =)( tVar  and ( )1+ttE υυ =0  
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13. Trapezoidal rule: ( )nn
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 ( Thomas and Finney (1985: 305-309) . In the calculation program, it was used 
the file called the integrate Java written in Java to calculate value of integral form 
eq.(25) for each observation. Then I took all necessary parameters which I 
calculated from eq.(22) in STATA to    Java program to compute the integral. In 
this program the numerical integration was done by the trapezoidal rule where 
h≈0.5 (ie. number of divisions 




 −
5.0
U
t
L
t RR
 and the exponential term calculated 
separately). After it, the whole valued of probability was calculated separately in 
Excel where the results from the Java were divided by Ut
L
t RR −  for each 
observation. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C Econometrics model 
 
Table 1.  The description of variables 
 
Variables Definition  
Exchange rate- 
te
 
Source: IFS  
Official exchange in rubbles per dollars at the end of month. Central Bank of Russia based on the Moscow Interbank 
Currency Exchange (MICEX) rate. The post –January 1, 1998 rubble is equal to 1.000 of the pre-January 1, 1998 rubbles. 
Exchange rate- r
te
 
Source: CRB 
Official US dollar to rubble rate (rubbles per dollars) is set daily and enacted from the following calendar day at the end of 
month. 
Foreign assets of the central 
bank-
tR  
Source: IFS 
 
Foreign assets and foreign liabilities comprise claims and liabilities in rubbles and other currencies: General government 
comprises central and local government units and their extra budgetary funds. This statistic is calculated as the sum of the 
foreign assets of Monetary Authorities and Deposit money banks minus the sum of foreign liabilities of Monetary 
Authorities and Deposit money banks. Foreign assets are dominated in domestic currency. 
Foreign assets of the central 
bank- r
tR  
Source: CBR 
Foreign assets- balances on Bank of Russia’s and credit institutions’ accounts recording transactions made  with non-
residents in foreign currency, the Russian currency and precious metals(balances on correspondent accounts, deposits and 
other funds placed in non-resident banks, credits extended to non-resident banks, non-resident legal entities and 
individuals, debt liabilities, and bill acquired from foreign governments, banks and other non-residents, investment into 
foreign companies’ and banks’ shares of stock) as well as foreign currency cash in credit institutions’ vault.  Foreign assets 
are dominated in domestic currency. 
M1 - 1
tm
 
Source: IFS 
 It measures the stock of narrow money, which comprises transferable deposits and currency outside deposit money banks 
and demand deposits other than those of the central government. This variable is in log form.  
M1 - r
tm
1
 
Source: CBR  
It measures the stock of narrow money, which comprises transferable deposits and currency outside deposit money banks 
and demand deposits other than those of the central government. This variable is in log form  
M2 - 2
tm
 
Source: IFS* 
It is the broader measure of money, is equal to M1 plus liabilities of these institution, which comprise time, saving and 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than central government. This variable is in the log form 
M2 - r
tm
2
 
Source: CBR 
It is the broader measure of money, is equal to M1 plus liabilities of these institution, which comprise time, saving and 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than central government. This variable is in the log form 
Gross Foreign  Liabilities- 
l
tR  
Source IFS  
The sum of the foreign liabilities of Monetary Authorities and Deposit money banks 
 
Gross Foreign  Liabilities- The sum of the Monetary Authorities’ foreign liabilities and the foreign liabilities borrowing by banking sector from non-
lr
tR  
Source: IFS, CBR 
residents: balances on LIBOR accounts, credits contracted, deposits, and other funds denominated in foreign currency, in 
the Russian Federation currency, and precious metal as well as IMF loans extended to Minfin and the CBR. 
Domestic Deposit Rates- 
ti  
Source: IFS 
 
 
This rate usually refers to rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, or saving deposits. Frequently, rates for 
time and saving deposits are classified according to maturity and amounts deposited; in additional, deposit money banks 
and similar deposit –taking institutions may offer short- and medium-term instruments at specific amounts and maturities; 
these are frequently termed ’’ certificates of deposit’’. Prevailing rate for one-month time deposits in denominations of 
more than Rub 300,000. Beginning in January 1997, weighted average rate offered by commercial banks on time deposits 
of households in national currency with remaining maturity of up to one year. The rate id weighted by deposit amounts. 
Domestic Deposit Rates- r
ti  
Source: CBR 
 
 
Interest rates on resident credit institutions ‘funds attracted into the CBR’s deposit accounts using Reuters Dealing 
System, on standard terms determined by the CBR provision 67-P 13.01.1999. For 1995 and 1995 deposit interest rate 
was a prevailing rate on the time deposit with monthly interest payment for amounts of RUR 300,000. But since 1997 up 
to now deposit rate is an average-weighted rate on deposits of private individuals in commercial banks (including 
Sberbank) for a term of up one year. 
Foreign interest rate *
ti  
Source: IFS 
United States one month Treasury Bill rate 
Domestic Credits  
Source: IFS 
The sums of the claims on central government,  the claims on State and Local Governments, the  Claims on Local 
government, the  Claims on Non-financial Public enterprises, the claims on the other financial institutions which is 
computed as the sum of Monetary Authorities’ claims and Deposit money banks’ claims 
Notes: CBR-date Bulletin of Banking Statistics and Monetary Survey of Central Bank of Russia (www.cbr.ru), IFS-date for IMF statistics of International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) -Monetary Survey and Monetary authorities’ data, Monetary Survey- Monetary authorities’ data in IFS generally consolidate the 
accounts of the central bank with the accounts arising from the monetary functions undertaken by other institutions. These functions include the issuance of 
currency, the holding of international reserves, and the conducting of Fund account transactions. Monetary Authorities: consolidates the accounts of the 
Central Bank of Russia and monetary authority functions conducted by the central government. All date include both ruble- and foreign –currency 
denominated accounts. Date before June 1995  were compiled by the IMF using basic accounting data and other information provided by authorities prior to 
establish of regular data reporting.,  M1 and M2-approximation of money supply), domestic credits  was an approximation of domestic assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.The money demand estimation. 
 
 
Data sources 
1 
Monthly 
Data 
IMF’s IFS 
2 
Monthly Data 
CBR 
3 
Monthly Data 
IMF’s IFS 
4 
Monthly 
Data 
CBR 
Monetary Base M1 M1 M2 M2 
 
Independent variable 
 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
   
Constant 10.43 
(0.0493) 
10.41 
(0.052) 
10.27 
(0.047) 
11.02 
(0.057) 
Domestic Interest rate -0.0032 
(0.0009) 
-0.0026 
(0.0008) 
-0.0024 
(0.0009) 
-0.0019 
(0.0009) 
nσ  0.37 0.377 0.543 0.361 
Test for autocorrelation     
Durbin-Watson 
d-statistics (2,103) 
2.0075 0.061 2.031 0.86 
Durbina’s alternative test 
for autocorrelation 
2.627    
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
Weisberg χ2 (1) 
2.611    
Test for  
heteroscedasticity 
    
Breush-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg χ2 (1) 
4.62 5.24 5.6 5.01 
White’s test  χ2 (2) 0.0047 9.14 0.0177 7.39 
Notes: The estimation of money demand was estimated eq. (1)
tttt nbiaqm +−=−  (1)  where 
),0(~ nt Nn σ with assumption (4) that tt ep = . Hence, the estimation equation 
was
tttt nbiaem +−=− . The domestic interest rate ti   was calculated as domestic deposit rates. For 
each column standard error are reported in brackets.  
 
Table 3 The foreign interest rate estimation 
 
Data Source Monthly Data-IMF’s IFS 
Independent variable Coefficient(p-value) 
Lag of foreign interest rate 0.991 
(0.052) 
Test for stationary  
Dicker-Fuller -2.58 critical value 5% -3.580 
Test for autocorrelation  
Durbin-Watson 
d-statistics (2,103) 
2.13 
Durbina’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation 
2.627 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg χ2 (1) 2.611 
Notes: The estimation of money demand was estimated eq. (3) 
ttt uii += −
*
1
*
  where .For each column 
standard error are reported in brackets.  
 
Note: tP  is estimated probability at the end of period t that the fixed exchange rate will be abandoned at the end of period t+1. 
tt DDD /)( 0− is the rate of domestic credit growth from the end of 1995 to end of period t.  
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